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Patient safety incidents in primary care dentistry in England and Wales: mixed methods study 1 
ABSTRACT 2 
Background: In recent decades, there has been considerable international attention aimed at 3 
improving the safety of hospital care, and more recently this attention has broadened to 4 
include primary medical care.  In contrast, the safety profile of primary care dentistry remains 5 
poorly characterized.  6 
Objectives: We aimed to describe the types of primary care dental patient safety incidents 7 
reported within a national incident reporting database and understand their contributory 8 
factors and consequences.  9 
Methods: We undertook a cross-sectional mixed-methods study, which involved analysis of a 10 
weighted randomized sample of the most severe incident reports from primary care dentistry 11 
submitted to England and Wales’ National Reporting and Learning System. Drawing on a 12 
conceptual literature-derived model of patient safety threats that we previously developed, 13 
we developed coding frameworks to describe and conduct thematic analysis of free text 14 
incident reports and determine the relationship between incident types, contributory factors 15 
and outcomes.  16 
Results: Out of 2,000 reports sampled, 1,456 were eligible for analysis. Sixty types of incidents 17 
were identified and organized across pre-operative (40.3%; n=587), intra-operative (56.1%; 18 
n=817) and post-operative (3.6%; n=52) stages. The main sources of unsafe care were delays 19 
in treatment (344/1,456; 23.6%),  procedural errors (excluding wrong-tooth extraction) 20 
(227/1,456; 15.6%), medication-related adverse incidents (161/1,456; 11.1%), equipment 21 
failure (90/1,456; 6.2%) and x-ray related errors (87/1,1456; 6.0%). Of all incidents that 22 
resulted in a harmful outcome (n=77; 5.3%), over half were due to wrong tooth extractions 23 
(37/77; 48.1%) mainly resulting from distraction of the densist. As a result of this type of 24 
incident, 34 of the 37 patients (91.9%) examined required further unnecessary procedures. 25 
Conclusions: Flaws in administrative processes need improvement since they are the main 26 
cause for patients experiencing delays in receiving treatment. Checklists and standardization 27 
of clinical procedures have the potential to reduce procedural errors and avoid over-utilization 28 
of services. Wrong-tooth extractions should be addressed through focused research initiatives 29 
and encouraging policy development to mandate learning from serious dental errors like never 30 
events. 31 
 32 
Keywords: Ambulatory dentistry, community dentistry, patient safety, patient safety 33 
incidents, primary dental care.  34 
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Introduction 35 
Healthcare-associated harm is estimated to occur in between 3% and 16% of hospital admissions.1-3 In 36 
primary care, between  two and three patient safety incidents occur per every 100 encounters;4 with 37 
approximately 4% of these primary care incidents resulting in severe harm.(4) Over the past 20 years, 38 
healthcare organizations, researchers and policymakers around the world have begun to pay increasing 39 
attention to patient safety. Accumulated evidence about the extent of harm and underlying causes has 40 
been translated into interventions designed to improve the safety of the healthcare system,5 such as 41 
incident reporting systems.6, 7  The need to develop and introduce these systems was signalled within 42 
the reports To Err is Human8 and An Organisation with a Memory.9 Their fundamental role is “to 43 
enhance patient safety by learning from failures of the health care system”.10 The analysis of the 44 
retrieved data from these systems provide valuable insights about the trends and patterns of patient 45 
safety hazards at an organizational level11  and can allow the identification of priorities for 46 
intervention.12 This information further bring opportunities to develop evidence-based models for safe 47 
practices and support for education and learning.11 Compared with other data sources,13 incident 48 
reporting systems can provide continuous, near real-time insights about diverse patient safety 49 
incidents, including near misses.  50 
Patient safety in primary care is a field that remains largely unexplored.14, 15 In the United Kingdom (UK), 51 
initial mixed-methods studies analyzing general practice incident reports from the National Reporting 52 
and Learning System (NRLS) have shown their utility to categorize PSIs and identify patterns of 53 
contributory incidents and contributory factors.16-20 However, patient safety research in dentistry is in 54 
its early development. A recent scoping review on PSIs and adverse events in dentistry shows that, over 55 
the past 20 years, this field has not employed standardized patient safety terminology and used varying 56 
study designs and methodologies to investigate unsafe care.21 As a result, the current evidence cannot 57 
be generalised and provide reliable estimates of the frequency of incidents, their causes, or the 58 
outcomes of these errors. To standardize patient safety research in dentistry, recent studies have 59 
started to focus on the characterization of patient safety incidents,22 including adverse events.23, 24 Only 60 
two studies have explored primary dental care data from national incident reporting systems,22, 25 from 61 
which one built an initial classification. (22) Although these classification systems provide a starting point, 62 
they should be further expanded/refined and include a clear distinction between incidents, their causes 63 
as well as the outcomes affecting the patient (adverse events) and healthcare system. Therefore, we 64 
aimed, firstly, to explore data from the NRLS to identify emerging themes and then develop categories 65 
and subcategories of incidents, their contributory factors, outcomes and degree of harm. Secondly, we 66 
aimed to describe incident patterns through identification of frequencies of the relationships between 67 
incidents and contributory factors. Thirdly, we aimed to describe the more frequent and harmful 68 
reported incidents.  69 
Methods 70 
We conducted a two-stage cross-sectional, mixed-methods study of the NRLS with a selected 71 
sample of reports from primary dental care for analysis. We combined qualitative methods and 72 
iterative generation of data summaries using descriptive statistical and thematic analysis 73 
methods.26 74 
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 75 
Data source 76 
The NRLS is a national reporting system created in 2003 for the NHS in England and Wales by the former 77 
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). It is one of the most comprehensive reporting systems in the 78 
world.27, 28 It consists of a database of incident reports submitted by National Health Service (NHS) 79 
healthcare organizations, however, patients and other members of the public can also submit online 80 
reports directly to the NHS. The NHS definition for the reported patient safety incidents refers to “any 81 
injury or unexpected incident that could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving 82 
NHS-funded healthcare.”29 Although reporting was initially voluntary, it has since 2010 been mandatory 83 
to report any incidents that resulted in severe patient harm or death. The reports contain categorical 84 
data (e.g. age, incident location and severity of harm) and three unstructured free-text fields to 85 
encourage reporters to provide a narrative description of the event, perceived causes and potential 86 
preventive measures.26 Incident reports describing severe harm and death outcome are reviewed by 87 
healthcare staff and safety experts responsible for the NRLS to identify opportunities for the continuous 88 
improvement of care.  89 
Sample selection 90 
The complete data set consisted of 42,729 reports over a period of 8 years (between April 2005 91 
and September 2013) from general practice in England and Wales. We applied the pre-coded 92 
NHS categories “Primary care setting” and “Dental surgery” to filter the dataset and obtain a 93 
sample of 11,836 records (see Figure 1). From these, we read the narrative descriptions and 94 
excluded the reports not related to dentistry. As a result, a revised sample of 4,247 reports 95 
was obtained. From this sample, all reports with a “moderate”, “severe” and “death” 96 
(combined total, n=257) outcome were included.  From the remaining “no harm” and “low 97 
harm” reports (n=3,990), a random sample of 1,743 reports, weighted by year and the severity 98 
of harm, was generated to prioritize more recent (2012-2013) and harmful reports. As a result, 99 
a total of 2,000 reports were included for coding. The detailed sampling strategy is shown in 100 
Appendix 1. 101 
 102 
Methodology 103 
An overview of the methodology is shown in Figure 1. For the first stage, we explored 400 104 
randomly-selected reports and deductively developed initial codes to structure the free-105 
narrative descriptions of the reported incidents. This resulted in three coding frameworks to 106 
describe what happened, i.e. type of incident (Appendix 2), perceived reasons the incident 107 
occurred, i.e. contributory factors (Appendix 3) and incident outcomes (Appendix 4). These 108 
frameworks present a hierarchical arrangement of first- and second-level codes that were 109 
continuously refined throughout the study. The codes were constantly compared against 110 
categories from other patient safety classification systems. These included the World Health 111 
Organization’s (WHO) International Classification for Patient Safety,30 the LINNEAUS Patient 112 
Safety Classification for Primary Care,31 the Primary Care Patient Safety (PISA) Classification 113 
System18 and the results obtained from our previous scoping review.21 The reports were coded 114 
by the first author (EEC). Moreover, a second coder (AS) was trained and provided the same 115 
sample of 400 randomly-selected reports and discussed with the main author, the challenges 116 
and additional improvements to the coding frameworks. For the second stage, we applied the 117 
coding frameworks on our weighted randomized sample of 2,000 reports. Following the 118 
method described by Rees et al.,17 we applied the nine rules of the Recursive Model of Incident 119 
5 
 
Analysis32 to structure the coding process (see Appendix 5). Following this approach, we 120 
applied between one to four codes in chronological order to describe primary incidents, 121 
contributory incidents and contributory factors. The main incident was labelled as a ‘primary 122 
incident’, which was the closest incident to the outcome experienced by the patient. Then, 123 
‘contributory incidents’ were defined as those incidents preceding the primary incidents. Both 124 
primary incidents and contributory incidents were coded in accordance with the incident 125 
coding framework (see Appendix 2). A ‘contributory factor’ was defined as “a circumstance, 126 
action or influence (such as poor rostering or task allocation) which is thought to have played a 127 
part in the origin or development of an incident, or to increase the risk of an incident”.33 128 
Contributory factors were coded in accordance with the contributory factors coding 129 
framework (see Appendix 3). Coding of the free-text narrative descriptions allowed the 130 
categorization of reports by incident type, potential contributory factors, outcome and severity 131 
of harm. This provided the basis for the subsequent data analysis. The severity of harm was 132 
assessed using the WHO’s International Classification of Patient Safety definitions (see Table 133 
1).30 To assess the inter-coder reliability, 20% of the reports (n=400) were double coded (EEC 134 
and AS). Then, raw agreement and Cohen’s K statistics34 were calculated for the primary 135 
incident. A kappa of >0.7 was sought between the two coders. Disagreements in coding were 136 
arbitrated by a third person. 137 
 138 
Data analysis 139 
For the first stage, during the data coding, the reports were further thematically analyzed and 140 
re-read for familiarization. If needed, new codes were created to capture additional semantic 141 
(descriptive and in-depth) insights and latent (underlying or inferred) insights present in the 142 
narrative descriptions and the circumstances (context) in which the incidents occurred.35, 36 All 143 
codes were grouped into themes and sub-themes to support our understanding of data and 144 
the underlying reasons for incidents that might not have been captured by the quantitative 145 
data.35, 36 For the second stage, we undertook an exploratory, descriptive analysis37 to generate 146 
descriptive summaries to identify priority areas based on: (i) the most frequent incidents; and 147 
(ii) the most harmful outcomes that resulted in moderate harm, severe harm or death. 148 
Following the method used by Rees et al.,17 we employed pivot tables in Microsoft Excel38 and 149 
cross-tabulated the most frequent incidents per clinical stage with available contributory 150 
incidents, contributory factor and their outcomes. We also cross-tabulated the degree of harm 151 
against the primary incident types to identify potential relationships in the data. Then, we 152 
identified additional patterns in the data by exploring all the frequencies of combinations of 153 
incidents and contributory factors (e.g. primary incident + secondary incident + contributory 154 
factor). 155 
 156 
Ethics  157 
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained from The University of Edinburgh’s Centre 158 
for Population Health Sciences Research Ethnics Committee. 159 
Results 160 
Of the 2,000 randomized reports, 1,456 were included in the quantitative analysis. Reports 161 
were excluded if they did not describe a patient safety incident (n=311), were not related to 162 
dentistry (n=125), concerned patient falls (n=31), contained insufficient details (n=23), dentist 163 
harmed rather than the patient (n=18), or were about general non-specific complaints (n=6). 164 
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Raw agreement (86.5%) and Cohen’s kappa (k) statistic for inter-rater coding reliability for 165 
primary incidents was high (k=0.860; p<0.01). 166 
 167 
Incidents 168 
Table 2 shows a description of the primary incidents we identified. These occurred in the pre-169 
operative (40.3%; n=587), intra-operative (56.1%; n=817) and post-operative (3.6%; n=52) 170 
stages of dental care delivery. Main pre-operative incidents were delays in treatment (58.6%, 171 
n=344), innaccurate information on medical record (10.4%, n=61) and breaches of 172 
confidentiality (4.8%, n=28). In the intra-operative stage, these included procedural errors 173 
(27.8%, n=227),  medication-related adverse incidents (161/817; 19.7%) and equipment failure 174 
(11.0%, n=90). The more frequent post-operative incidents were contraindicated medications 175 
prescribed/dispensed (n=15; 28.8%) and errors in the process of delivering a medication (n=12; 176 
23.1%). Regardless of the clinical stage, the main five incident types were delays in treatment 177 
(23.6%; n=344), procedural errors (excluding wrong-tooth extraction) (15.6%; n=227), 178 
medication-related adverse incidents (11.1%; n=161), equipment failure (6.2%; n=90) and x-ray 179 
related errors (6.0%; n=87). 180 
 181 
Contributory incidents and contributory factors 182 
Of the 1,456 primary incidents, 34.8% (n=506) contained data about contributory incidents. 183 
From these 506, main contributory incidents were the dentist´s unavailability (20.2%), 184 
equipment failure (14.6%) and mismanagement of appointments (12.6%). Data about 185 
contributory factors were available in 42.8% (n=623) of the reports. From these 623, main 186 
contributory factors included distraction (25.5%), insufficient staff members (25.5%) and 187 
inadequate skills or knowledge (11.2%). All the possible combinations of primary incidents with 188 
contributory incidents and contributory factors organized by clinical stage are available in 189 
Appendices 6-8.  190 
 191 
In the pre-operative period, frequent contributory incidents for delays in treatment or 192 
procedure (n=344) were the dentist´s unavailability (29.7%, n=102), mismanaging of 193 
appointments (16.9%, n=58), and ineffective transportation of patients (7.3%, n=25) (Examples 194 
1 to 3 in Box 1). Contributory factors included insufficient staff members (32.3%, n=111) 195 
(Example 4 in Box 1) and lack of equipment maintenance (4.4%, n=15). Secondly, for reports 196 
concerning innaccurate information on records (n=61), main contributory incidents were 197 
Information Technology (IT)-related errors (23.0%, n=14) (Example 5 in Box 1). Thirdly, for 198 
reports concerning breaches of confidentiality (n=28), frequent contributory incidents were 199 
the inefficient transfer of information between healthcare settings and wrong medical records 200 
(7.1%; n=2 each) (Example 6 in Box 1). Main contributory factors were failure to adhere to 201 
procedures or regulations (50.0%, n=14) (Example 7 in Box 1) and distraction (14.3%, n=4).  202 
 203 
In the intra-operative period, contributory incidents for procedural errors (n=227) included 204 
equipment failure (9.3%, n=21) (Example 8 in Box 1) and insufficient clinical examination (2.2%, 205 
n=5). Main contributory factors were distraction (31.3%, n=71) (Example 9 in Box 1), 206 
unexpected movement from the patient (10.1%, n=23) (Example 10 in Box 1) and inadequate 207 
skills or knowledge (8.8%, n=20). Then, for medication-related adverse incidents (n=161), 208 
contributory factors included the patient’s previous health-related conditions (13.7%, n=22) 209 
(Example 11 in Box 1) and non-compliance from the patient (5.6%, n=9) (Example 12 in Box 1). 210 
Lastly, for incidents concerning equipment failure (n=90), main contributory factors were lack 211 
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of equipment maintenance (44.4%, n=40) and poor equipment design (6.7%, n=6) (Example 13 212 
in Box 1). In the post-operative period, contributory incidents for contraindicated medications 213 
prescribed/dispensed (n=15) were insufficient clinical examination (20.0%, n=3) (Example 14 214 
in Box 1). Contributory factors included the patient’s previous history on allergies (46.7%, n=7)  215 
(Example 15 in Box 1) and staff distraction (20.0%, n=3) (Example 16 in Box 1). Errors in the 216 
process of delivering a medications (n=10) (Example 17 in Box 1) did not include  contributory 217 
incidents or factors. 218 
 219 
Outcomes 220 
Table 3 shows the characterization of incident outcomes. Of the 1,456 incidents, 40.0% 221 
(n=583) did not describe an outcome. The more frequent outcomes were increased 222 
documentation/follow-up (12.4%; n=181), vasovagal response (8.2%; n=119), 223 
laceration/bleeding (6.9%; n=100), delays in using the dental clinic (5.8%; n=84), unnecessary 224 
x-ray exposure (5.1%; n=74) and repeated procedures/additional treatment (4.9%; n=72). 225 
Cross-tabulations of outcomes (n=1,456) with the degree of harm showed that 97.7% resulted 226 
in either no harm or low harm (n=1,379), and only 5.3% were harmful (n= 77). The main 227 
harmful ouctomes were unnecessary procedures (44.2%; n=34), anaphylaxis (9.1%; n=7) and 228 
vasovagal responses (7.8%; n=6). Cross-tabulations of these harmful outcomes with the 229 
primary incidents showed that all harmful reports that resulted in unnecessary procedures 230 
(n=34) were due to to wrong-tooth extractions. Then, harmful reports involving anaphylaxis 231 
(n=7) were mainly due to medication-related adverse incidents (42.9%; n=3) and 232 
contraindicated medications prescribed/dispensed (28.6%; n=2). Finally, harmful vasovagal 233 
responses (n=6) were mostly due to medication-related adverse incidents (83.3%; n=5). 234 
 235 
For the main pre-operative incidents, frequent outcomes for delays in treatment (n=344) 236 
included increased documentation/follow-up (23.3%, n=80) and repeated procedures or 237 
additional treatment (5.8%, n=20) (Examples 18 and 19 in Box 1). Incorrect or unavailable 238 
documentation (n=61) mostly led to increased documentation/follow-up (14.8%, n=9) and 239 
delays in using the dental clinic (8.2%, n=5) (Examples 20 and 21 in Box 1). One breach of 240 
confidentiality resulted in legal implications (3.6%, 1/28;). Secondly, for the main intra-241 
operative incindents, procedural errors (n=227) included laceration/bleeding (41.9%, n=95), 242 
chemical injuries (9.3%, n=21), repeated procedures/additional treatment (7.5%, n=17) and 243 
thermal injuries (6.2%, n=14) (Examples 23 to 26 in Box 1). Medication-related adverse 244 
incidents (n=161) mostly led to a vasovagal responses (64.0%, n=103) (Examples 27 and 28 in 245 
Box 1). Equipment failure (n=90) mostly led to delays in using the dental clinic (34.4%, n=31) 246 
(Example 29 in Box 1). Finally, for main post-operative incidents, contraindicated medications 247 
prescribed/dispensed (n=15) led to increased documentation/follow-up and anaphylaxis 248 
(20.0%, n=3 each) (Example 30 in Box 1). The majority of the reports concerning errors in the 249 
process of delivering a medication did not describe harmful outcomes (75.0%, 9/12). 250 
 251 
Discussion 252 
To our knowledge, this is the first mixed-methods study of incident reports from primary care 253 
dentistry, identifying the main incident types, their contributory factors and outcomes (clinical 254 
and non-clinical). At a conceptual level, our methodological approach aligns with the Swiss 255 
Cheese Model of System Accidents proposed by Reason.39 Moreover, this mixed-methods 256 
approach seeks to identify the chronological sequence of events leading up to error by drawing 257 
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upon the Recursive Model for Incident Analysis. This approach has been used in general 258 
practice16-18, 40, 41 and has received positive reviews.42 We drew on a large national database of 259 
incidents and achieved very good agreement between two independent coders. Our coding 260 
frameworks enabled us to understand the relationships between incident types and 261 
contributory factors which highlight opportunities to improve patient safety.  262 
 263 
However, we also acknowledge that the reports analyzed likely constitute the tip of the 264 
iceberg43 as these only included events that were actually reported. Although the NRLS has 265 
collected over 15 million reports since 2003, less than 1% of these reports originate from 266 
primary care.44 Whilst NHS healthcare professionals might be aware of the NRLS, their fear of 267 
punishment from reporting incidents, the time required to report, and the lack of belief that 268 
reporting will lead to change are all recognized barriers to reporting.44  Also, our ability to 269 
extract detailed information surrounding context (e.g. demographics and disciplines involved) 270 
was limited as the reports were largely unstructured. Renton and Sabbah (2016) also reported 271 
this data quality issue.25 In addition, the free narrative descriptions were often shorthanded 272 
and contained abbreviations or other jargon to describe clinical procedures. To bring sense to 273 
the data and avoid the risk of confirmation bias,45 we assigned codes which represented what 274 
was explicitly described in the reports; inferences were avoided, in particular when no explicit 275 
description was available. Therefore, following the rules from the Recursive Model of Incident 276 
Analysis, we coded “primary incidents” as those closest to the outcome. Then, if available, we 277 
coded “contributory incidents” as those incidents that preceded the primary incident. We 278 
believe this work provides a starting point to systematically characterize future incident reports 279 
from primary care dentistry (Appendices 2 to 4).22, 23, 25, 46-50  280 
 281 
Incidents 282 
In our study, delays in treatment were the main pre-operative incidents and remained as the 283 
most frequent among all incident types. Although these incidents were not harmful in our 284 
study, their presence reveal flaws in the provision of efficient dental care. Nevertheless, delays 285 
in treatment can still contribute to diagnostic delays, which can result in the unnecessary 286 
clinical deterioration or complication of the patient´s condition or disease.51 Therefore, we 287 
recommend improving administrative processes by understanding the demand for dental care 288 
services in the range of care contexts used for delivery. Guidance for the provision of safe, 289 
reliable and effective care is available from the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI),52 290 
including a dentistry-focused IHI Open School course in partnership with the Dental Quality 291 
Alliance, established by the American Dental Association.53 292 
 293 
Our findings also revealed that procedural errors were the main intra-operative incidents and 294 
the second most frequent among all incident types. Their frequency could be reduced by 295 
determining warranted and unwarranted variations in clinical practice. This might be achieved 296 
by reviewing compliance with evidence-based or best practice guidelines. However, an 297 
emerging threat to patient safety is the increasing complexity of clinical cases and multi-298 
morbidities as the population gets older by living longer.54 Therefore, as discussed by Hollnagel 299 
et al.,55 clinicians should also have flexibility to adapt their procedures in accordance with the 300 
specific needs of the patient being treated. Equipment failure was the third most common 301 
intra-operative incident and the fourth most frequent among all incident types. This type of 302 
incident has been described previously by Perea-Perez et al.,47 Hiivala et al.48, 50 and an issue 303 
identified from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Manufacturer and User Facility 304 
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Device Experience (MAUDE) database.56 Based on our findings, we believe equipment-failure 305 
incidents can be reduced by having all staff members familiarized with the maintenance 306 
processes and assign responsibility to team members to carry out this task on a periodical basis. 307 
In identifying patterns of incidents, we also identified equipment failure as a “contributory 308 
incident” for other “primary incidents” such as procedural errors and errors in obtaining or 309 
processing x-rays. This highlights the interaction of healthcare professionals with sophisticated 310 
tools and technologies could increase risk to patient safety,54 and manufacturers should 311 
support practitioners and staff to safely use their equipment. 312 
 313 
In our study, wrong-tooth extractions were the main source of harmful incidents. Although not 314 
frequent (2.7%), these have been studied previously22, 25 and they meet the criteria of ‘never 315 
events’ due to their severity and degree of preventability.25, 57 Prevention of these and other 316 
incidents can be achieved through the use available procedural checklists58-61 to reduce 317 
reliance on memory and thus, limiting the impact of distraction or inattention in the 318 
occurrence of incidents.62 A recent systematic review on patient safety interventions in 319 
dentistry revealed that surgical safety checklists, which covers tooth extractions, 320 
demonstrated efficacy to reduce or minimize AEs.63 We also identified other less frequent 321 
intra-operative incidents, which have been also reported in the literature. These include the 322 
inhalation and ingestion of foreign objects, reported through the review of relatively small 323 
samples of adverse event case reports,49 malpractice cases,47 and dental patient records.64 324 
Although not frequent, inhalation of foreign objects alone has recently been proposed as a 325 
´never event´ through international consensus.65 326 
 327 
Perea-Perez et al.47 and Hiivala et al.48, 50 also previously reported similar post-operative 328 
incidents. However, incidents related to prescription of medications, or their dispensing, 329 
remain largely unreported.21 Therefore, the evidence base about medication errors in dentistry 330 
needs further investigation. Medication errors involving antibiotics for example contribute to 331 
antimicrobial resistance worldwide66 and antimicrobial resistance is an emerging threat to 332 
patient safety in the next 30 years.54 Recently, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched 333 
the third Global Patient Safety Challenge to minimize medication related error67 and dentistry 334 
should consider its contribution to this global agenda. 335 
 336 
Contributory incidents and contributory factors  337 
The majority of medical errors are due to faulty systems and processes.8 Reason´s Swiss cheese 338 
model of system accidents39 shows that human errors are often a consequence of latent 339 
organizational flaws, such as administrative or management issues. Our findings corroborate 340 
this and revealed issues of accessibility to services and mismanagement of appointments, 341 
insufficient staff members and lack of equipment maintenance. These issues were mainly 342 
related, as a contributory incident or a contributory factor, to patients experiencing delays in 343 
receiving treatment, which was the main incident reported to the NRLS. Although these 344 
incidents did not lead to harmful outcomes, they reveal the underutilization of primary dental 345 
care services. Underutilization of care is a prevalent issue in both high- and low-income 346 
economies.68 Factors contributing to this issue broadly include: a) inaccessible healthcare 347 
services to the patient, b) the unavailability of effective services, for instance the result of a 348 
lack of resources, c) the clinician’s failure to provide effective care, and d) the patients’ 349 
(inadequate) compliance and adherence to effective healthcare interventions.68 As the 350 
organizational structure of dental care is likely to differ between countries and clinical settings, 351 
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we believe quality improvement strategies should be developed and implemented locally. 352 
Distraction and unexpected movement from the patient were the most frequent “contributory 353 
factors” for procedural incidents and wrong-tooth extractions. This highlights any unexpected 354 
distraction can create conditions for unsafe care. Other reported contributory factors in the 355 
literature for wrong-extractions include: i) inadequate checks, ii) incorrect radiographs, and iii) 356 
wrong diagnoses have also been reported as causes for wrong-tooth extraction.25  357 
 358 
Outcomes  359 
Vasovagal responses and lacerations/bleeding were the most commonly described adverse 360 
outcomes. However, the majority of outcomes resulted in either no harm or low harm (94.7%; 361 
n=1,379) which frequently resulted in increased documentation/follow-up, delays in using the 362 
dental clinic, unnecessary x-ray exposure and repeated procedures/additional treatment. The 363 
identification of these outcomes showed the presence of flaws in the provision of efficient and 364 
effective primary dental care, which in addition to patient safety highlight two further 365 
compromised aims of quality improvement, as proposed by the former IOM.51 Moreover, the 366 
over-utilization of healthcare services can: a) contribute to future unnecessary harm; b) result 367 
in additional financial demands for the patient; and c) cause waste of resources within the 368 
healthcare system.69 369 
 370 
Our findings have helped to identify priority issues for improvement and are a starting point 371 
for setting patient safety research priorities in dentistry.70 Patient safety in dentistry is still an 372 
emerging discipline which needs to be further developed in parallel with the quality of care. 373 
Health services researchers designing patient-safety-oriented interventions51 should consider 374 
the more frequent and most harmful incidents reported in this study. Policy makers could take 375 
note of these emerging priorities and allocate resources accordingly. We believe this approach 376 
will contribute to reduce unintended harm and support appropriate utilization of primary 377 
dental care services. Our proposed priority issues can be pursued within research strategies 378 
that embrace robust primary research designs and methods with agreed working definitions.30 379 
Examples of these research designs include mixed methods studies of a mix of complimentary 380 
secondary data (e.g. medical records, malpractice cases). In doing so, priority areas and 381 
knowledge gaps should be corroborated in local contexts,71 as well as furthering advances 382 
already made for data collection methods and taxonomies for patient safety in dentistry.72 383 
Natural Language Processing (NLP) could support the pace of progress and in terms of 384 
analysing large volumes of data about unsafe dentistry offers a set of informatics tools capable 385 
of transforming text into a structured format that can be used for research.73 For example, 386 
data extraction systems based on NLP have been developed in the medical domain.74 However, 387 
this innovation has yet to be explored in dentistry. Incident reporting systems, such as the NRLS 388 
in England and Wales, have generated many lessons to improve patient safety. The Council of 389 
European Dentists’ has already recommended the development of reporting systems in 390 
dentistry,75 and these should now be either developed exclusively for the profession or 391 
integrated into existing reporting systems, such as the NRLS, now the Patient Safety 392 
Information Management System led by NHS Improvement. Also, any further dentistry-393 
focused initiative needs to be supported by clear regulations and policies that allow private 394 
and healthcare-funded dental practices to report incidents, preferably to a single system. 395 
Where multiple regulators have complimentary functions in countries, clear processes about 396 
incident reporting are needed for the dental profession to follow.76 397 
 398 
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Conclusions 399 
Our study represents an important step forward into the characterization patient safety 400 
incidents and their contributory factors in primary care dentistry. Initiatives to improve quality, 401 
including patient safety, in dentistry should focus on improving the main sources of unsafe care 402 
identified in this work. However, our findings also reveal that over-utilization of dental care 403 
services is an issue that can be easily overlooked by researchers, policy makers and members 404 
of the dental profession. As more patient safety focused evidence continues to emerge, this 405 
needs to be integrated into evidence-based guidelines and compliance with these guidelines 406 
needs to be encouraged through fostering a patient safety culture. Patient safety is an 407 
emerging field in dentistry that offers a wide spectrum of opportunities for both research and 408 
improvement. 409 
  410 
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Tables 590 
Table 1. Criteria for describing the severity of harm30 591 
Severity of harm Definition Examples in dentistry 
No harm Patient outcome is not symptomatic, and no treatment is 
required 
Patient’s lip got accidentally caught by hand piece 
bur without any visible injury 
Low harm 
Patient outcome is symptomatic, symptoms are mild, loss 
of function or harm is minimal and intermediate but short 
term, and no or minimal intervention is required 
Contact of etching gel to the oral mucosa during 
procedure 
Moderate harm 
Patient outcome is symptomatic requiring intervention, an 
increased length of stay, or causing permanent or long-
term harm or loss of function 
Fracture of the maxillary or mandible during surgical 
procedure 
Severe harm 
Patient outcome is symptomatic, requiring life-saving 
intervention or major surgical/medical intervention, 
shortening life expectancy or causing major permanent or 
long-term harm or loss of function 
Non-fatal anaphylactic reaction to local anesthesia 
that resulted in hospitalization 
Death 
On the balance of probabilities, death was caused or 
brought forward in the short term by the incident 
Fatal anaphylactic reaction to local anesthesia 
 592 
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Table 2. Characterization of incidents per degree of harm 594 
Incident types No
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 (%
)  
Preoperative stage 578 7 1   1 587 2 0.3 
Delays in treatment 343 1    344  0.0 
Inaccurate information on medical record 61     61  0.0 
Breaches of confidentiality 28     28  0.0 
Mismanagement of appointments 19     19  0.0 
Ineffective transportation of patients 16     16  0.0 
Record not up to date 12 2 1   15 1 6.7 
Inefficient transfer of information between settings 15     15  0.0 
Referral errors 13 1    14  0.0 
Communication errors 14     14  0.0 
Insufficient supplies 13     13  0.0 
Dentist is not accessible 10     10  0.0 
Errors in treatment plan 7 1    8  0.0 
Professionalism issue 7     7  0.0 
Insufficient clinical examination 6     6  0.0 
Wrong medical record 5     5  0.0 
Errors in obtaining the informed consent 3 1    4  0.0 
Diagnostic errors 2    1 3 1 33.3 
Inaccurate laboratory test results 2     2  0.0 
Payment issues 2     2  0.0 
Failure to follow-up  1    1  0.0 
         
Intraoperative stage 434 311 69 1 2 817 72 8.8 
Procedural error 78 139 10   227 10 4.4 
Medication-related adverse incidents 6 132 21  2 161 23 14.3 
Equipment failure 85 5    90  0.0 
X-ray related errors 87     87  0.0 
Broken instrument 79 4    83  0.0 
Ingestion / inhalation of foreign body 36 6    42  0.0 
Wrong tooth extracted 2  37   39 37 94.9 
Ineffective infection control practices 30     30  0.0 
Non-specified procedural complications 6 18 1 1  26 2 7.7 
Wrong anatomical side or site treated 6 5    11  0.0 
Insufficient supplies 11     11  0.0 
Equipment not available 2     2  0.0 
Errors in obtaining a biopsy 1 1    2  0.0 
Contraindicated dental material used 2     2  0.0 
Wrong instrument used 1     1  0.0 
Complication as a result of the dental material used  1    1  0.0 
Errors in treatment plan 1     1  0.0 
Supplies out of date 1     1  0.0 
         
Postoperative 46 3 3     52 3 5.8 
Contraindicated medication prescribed / dispensed 12 1 2   15 2 13.3 
Errors in delivering a medication 11  1   12 1 8.3 
Prescription errors 10 1    11  0.0 
Medication incorrectly stored 5     5  0.0 
Unintentional drug overdose (self-administered) 3 1    4  0.0 
Medication not available 3     3  0.0 
Lost prescription 2         2   0.0 
Grand Total 1058 321 73 1 3 1456 77 5.3 
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Table 3. Characterization of outcomes per degree of harm 596 
Outcome types Lo
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)  
Incident occurred but no outcome   582       582   0.0 
         
Organizational inconvenience 14 290 2     306 2 0.7 
Increased documentation / follow-up 11 169 1   181 1 0.6 
Delays in using the facilities  84    84  0.0 
Long wait service  22    22  0.0 
Treating patients without sufficient 
information 2 14    16  0.0 
Legal implication 1 1 1   3 1 33.3 
         
Inconvenience to patients (non-clinical) 15 145 37     197 37 18.8 
Unnecessary x-ray exposure  74    74  0.0 
Repeated procedures / additional treatment 9 60 3   72 3 4.2 
Unnecessary procedures 6 11 34   51 34 66.7 
         
Local outcomes 144 28 17     189 17 9.0 
Laceration/bleeding 89 9 2   100 2 2.0 
Chemical injury 14 8    22  0.0 
Thermal injury 15  1   16 1 6.3 
Localized pain/discomfort 8 6 1   15 1 6.7 
Extended paresthesia 6  5   11 5 45.5 
Bruises 3 3    6  0.0 
Skin tear 4 1    5  0.0 
Fracture  1 4   5 4 80.0 
Needlestick injuries 3     3  0.0 
Necrosis of soft-tissues   2   2 2 100.0 
Post treatment infection / abscess   2   2 2 100.0 
Affection of the temporomandibular joint 1     1  0.0 
Swelling 1     1  0.0 
         
Systemic outcomes 144 12 17 1   174 18 10.3 
Vasovagal response 103 10 6   119 6 5.0 
Seizure 19 2    21  0.0 
Anaphylaxis 11  6 1  18 7 38.9 
Difficulty to breathe 7  1   8 1 12.5 
Prolonged sleep / unrousable after sedation 3     3  0.0 
Cardio-respiratory arrest   2   2 2 100.0 
Angina attack   1   1 1 100.0 
Methemoglobinemia   1   1 1 100.0 
Laryngospasm and bronchospasm 1     1  0.0 
         
Psychological / emotional distress 4 1       5   0.0 
         
Death         3 3 3 100.0 
Grand Total 321 1058 73 1 3 1456 77 5.3 
 597 
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 599 
 600 
Box 1. Free-text examples of key incidents. These are extracts from the free-text narrative descriptions 
of patient safety incidents reported to the National Reporting Learning System. The extracts have been edited 
by the authors to correct typographical errors and remove indecipherable text. 
 
Example 1. The dentist rang the clinic, said he was on his way in but had a call to go back home to help with 
the family (sickness of relative). The dentist said he was sorry for the late call and could we let (person’s 
name) know said he would definitely be in tomorrow. 
 
Example 2. Due to a communication breakdown, the dental nurse and dentist left for an appointment offsite 
without realizing that the patient, who was due to be seen, had arrived early onsite with her mother and had 
been overlooked. This meant that the patient was not able to be seen that day. 
 
Example 3. The patient was taken to the wrong clinic by transport and was left with a carer to walk to the 
actual clinic. The patient was left waiting for 1 hour 50 mins before the transport collected her after 2 phone 
calls to ask pick up time which was 1120hr - one hour after appointment time. The patient was eventually 
collected by transport. 
 
Example 4. The dental nurse called in sick. Patients had to be cancelled as an agency nurse was not available. 
The senior nurse was unable to step in as it was her paperwork day. 
 
Example 5. Patient double booked by dental nurses. The appointment was cancelled at short notice 1 hour 
prior to scheduled visit. Request to cancel delegated to reception staff. The patient was contacted by consultant 
and reassurance was given to address this. 
 
Example 6. An email containing identifiable patient information (first name and referral dates) was forwarded 
to an incorrect staff member due to similar names. The staff member was notified by the sender and deleted 
the information with immediate action. Provider governance and information governance informed, voice mail 
left for director of clinical services/line manager. Under pressure from several deadlines and doing more than 
one task on the PC at once. No surname, address to NHS number were included in this email. 
 
Example 7. During clinical waster audit, 2 black bags opened to look at contents, patients’ letter with full 
details of name, address and all clinical details. Also, patient address labels for another patient. Black waste is 
destroyed in land fill sites. Breach of confidential information. 
 
Example 8. Stockland Green - whilst patient under sedation undergoing procedure part, the bur detached from 
hand piece and disappeared suction checked, and mouth checked. Bur not located, procedure stopped, and 
patient’s father was informed. 
 
Example 9. The dentist asked for a saline solution in a syringe to irrigate a socket after extraction. I accidentally 
gave him sodium hypochlorite in a syringe labelled sodium hypochlorite. I handed the syringe to the dentist 
which he used to irrigate the socket, then by the smell he realized that it wasn't the saline solution and he 
informed me. I went and got the saline and put it in a syringe and handed it to the dentist and he used it to 
irrigate the socket. 
 
Example 10. The floor of the patient’s mouth has been cut by a high-speed diamond bur approximately 5mm 
in length sublingually in LR5 / 6 area. Patient jerked during treatment causing hand piece to slip, thus, causing 
a wound. 
 
Example 11. The patient attended dental clinic for routine care. Following the administration of local 
anesthetic, the patient began wheezing. Asthmatic patient. 
 
Example 12. The patient suffered a hypoglycaemic attack at 4:45pm after we had finished dental treatment. 
The patient had extreme shaking; her speech was extremely slurred. The patient had not eaten since 11:30, the 
patient felt unwell whilst we were doing dental treatment, but she didn't want to stop us. We observed the 
patient whilst she recovered and escorted her home. The patient suffered a hypoglycaemic attack and was given 
to glucose drinks, hypostop and some chocolate. 
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Box 1. Free-text examples of key incidents. These are extracts from the free-text narrative descriptions 
of patient safety incidents reported to the National Reporting Learning System. The extracts have been edited 
by the authors to correct typographical errors and remove indecipherable text. 
Example 13. A leak from the 3 in 1 equipment. It leaked while a patient was having treatment. The patient was 
unhappy about getting soaked. I was not noticed sooner that there was a problem with the equipment. The 
problem with the equipment should have been reported when it was first noticed and not left until a patient 
made a complaint. Staff meeting held. All staff to report any equipment problems straight away to the practice 
manager. 
 
Example 14. The patient came to the surgery with pericoronitis on lower right third molar and facial swelling. 
The patient was given a 1 x 3g amoxicillin sachet, which he took on the spot. We noticed he was allergic to 
penicillin, he rang his mother, and she informed he once had swelling and rash when he was a child, no incidents 
since. The patient was informed of this and advised to go to emergencies. The staff rang NHS direct and could 
not advice on the situation. The patient stayed in the practice for about an hour, and he showed no symptoms 
of allergy. 
 
Example 15. Patient attended the emergency clinic with a toothache. He was assessed and prescribed 
amoxicillin. The patient returned the following day as there wasn't any improvement in the pain. The dentist 
working that session noticed he had been prescribed amoxicillin, but the patient was allergic. The dentist told 
the patient to stop taking the amoxicillin immediately and prescribed an alternative. The patient was happy 
with this. He had only taken one of the amoxicillin prescribed. 
 
Example 16. A prescription was made out for Amoxicillin 500mg*21 and Metronidazole 200mg*21. The notes 
said the patient was allergic penicillin. The patient has a complex medical history. The dentist concentration 
was on other aspects of the consultation. The dentist realized his prescribing error within a few minutes while 
writing up patient notes. Staff went out of the building to see if the patient was still nearby. The patient does 
not have contact telephone numbers. Dentist immediately advised senior colleague and clinical director. 
 
Example 17. The dentist gave a prescription form for a 3g sachet. I dispensed 250mgs capsules. Dentist 
informed, asked me to contact the patient to return for correct antibiotics. 
 
Example 18. The Senior Dental Officer expected to find the laboratory work for his patient as it was due to 
be fitted at the next appointment, but it was discovered that it had not been delivered. The Senior Dental 
Officer telephoned the laboratory, and they informed him that the work in question had gone missing at the 
lab. The lab suggested that an ex - worker at the premises may have been responsible for the missing work or 
may have sabotaged the work. The lab apologized, offered to re - start the work and to prioritize the job. 
 
Example 19. I was unable to view a letter regarding a patient on the computer. We tried to read the letter on 
the computer in the office in (name of clinic) and then on the two computers on the dental reception, but were 
unable to operate the file, despite clicking on the letter etc. Eventually, a dental nurse was able to access the 
letter from the clinic. This is unacceptable when trying to view information directly relating to a patient 
management. 
 
Example 20. Unable to access patient’s radiographs from September 09. Attempted at 10:20m, still unavailable 
12:25 at the end of appointment. The patient had to be reappointed to complete the treatment plan as a 
consequence. 
 
Example 21. R4 system is running very slowly and erratically throughout the day. Difficulty in accessing 
patient records and very difficult writing up notes. Delay in seeing patients and extra work for the clinician. 
Stressful. 
 
Example 22. Confidentiality breach to GP and family members of HIV status by Dental clinic. Incident being 
investigated as Serious Incident. 
 
Example 23. Dentist slipped with luxator during dental extraction and cut the lingual artery; the bleeding 
stopped after 2 sutures. 
 
Example 24. During root canal treatment, a needle containing hypochlorite, came away from the syringe, 
causing spillage. The patient was wearing rubber dam and safety goggles. However, he felt that some solution 
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Box 1. Free-text examples of key incidents. These are extracts from the free-text narrative descriptions 
of patient safety incidents reported to the National Reporting Learning System. The extracts have been edited 
by the authors to correct typographical errors and remove indecipherable text. 
had passed into his left eye. Advice was sought from ophthalmology – the eye was washed with running water 
& saline – the patient is to attend A&E & eye clinic if necessary. 
 
Example 25. The patient stated she had been attending for regular check-ups and declared dentally fit until the 
single handed general dental practitioner retired. On a recent routine visit to locum dentist, patient told she 
needs emergency treatment or risks loss of some teeth, crowns poorly fitted and inappropriate anyway, may 
need dentures, the patient is only in her 40’s. Apparent poor performance of previous general dental 
practitioner. 
 
Example 26. The patient sustained a burn to the lip with heated excavator whilst removing excess of gutta 
percha. The excavator burnt through the rubber dam but was not noticed as the patient was under local 
anesthesia. The patient was informed, and Vaseline was applied to the area. 
 
Example 27. The patient was given topical anesthetic followed by infiltration of local anesthetic. After 
approximately 3-4 minutes, the patient looked unwell, and head started to roll grey and sweaty. No recovery 
with oxygen and worsened on sitting upright again. 
 
Example 28. I gave a right inferior dental block. A few minutes later, the patient lost consciousness, rolled 
eyes, went stiff and slumped. The effect lasted less than a minute. The patient was very pale, on regaining 
consciousness, the patient did not remember. The treatment proceeded uneventfully. 
 
Example 29. I gave the patient local anesthetic, but the portable suction started to fail whilst the nurse was 
trying to aspirate. Treatment could not be completed in surgery 3. Surgery 1 had a free bay. Therefore, the 
patient had to be transferred to surgery 1 in order for me to complete treatment. Patient care not affected. 
 
Example 30. Amoxicillin 250mg three times daily was prescribed to the patient for an infected socket after 
asking whether she was allergic to penicillin. The patient called in approximately half an hour later saying that 
she has gone red in her face and is itchy on her legs advised to come back immediately. No stridor angioedema 
or wheezing, itching on her legs. Called GPs downstairs who agreed to see her immediately send patient 
downstairs with a nurse and she was temporarily registered with the GP practice and was seen by one of the 
GPs. Called her in the afternoon to see how she was. Patient felt all right. Updated medical history regarding 
penicillin allergy. 
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Figure 1. Overview of the methodology 
